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ABSTRACT

In the past decade, cyber operations have been increasingly utilized to further
policy goals of state-sponsored actors to shift the balance of politics and power on a
global scale. One of the ways this has been evidenced is through the exploitation of
electric grids via cyber means. A remote tripping command injection attack is one of
the types of attacks that could have devastating effects on the North American power
grid. To better understand these attacks and create detection axioms to both quickly
identify and mitigate the effects of a remote tripping command injection attack, a dataset
comprised of 128 variables (primarily synchrophasor measurements) was analyzed via
statistical methods and machine learning algorithms in RStudio and WEKA software
respectively. While statistical methods were not successful due to the non-linearity and
complexity of the dataset, machine learning algorithms surpassed accuracy metrics
established in previous research given a simplified dataset of the specified attack and
normal operational data. This research allows future cybersecurity researchers to better
understand remote tripping command injection attacks in comparison to normal
operational conditions. Further, an incorporation of the analysis has the potential to
increase detection and thus mitigate risk to the North American power grid in future
work.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank my wife Amelie for the support, patience, and
putting up with the many nights of not enjoying the beautiful Florida weather due to this
academic endeavor. I’d also like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Bruce Caulkins. Your
guidance and encouragement throughout this process has been absolutely crucial for
completion, and I greatly appreciate the countless meetings and emails exchanged over
the course of these past two years. I’d also like to thank the members of my thesis
advisory committee, Dr. Wiegand and Dr. Lathrop. Dr. Wiegand, your help with
statistical methods and machine learning algorithms for the last six months has been
integral in the construction of this thesis. Thanks for your patience, and ability to explain
complex subject matter in a way that is both meaningful and easy to understand and
integrate into this work. Dr. Lathrop, thanks for providing insight about my methodology
and asking the questions which ultimately led me in the right direction regarding thinking
about the research questions and formulating a solution. I’d also like to acknowledge
Dr. Owen Wilson and Dr. Tommy Morris, subject matter experts (SMEs) in Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) and my sounding board regarding all domain related questions;
without your knowledge and the construction of this dataset, this thesis would not have
been possible.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ viii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ x
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................xi
CHAPTER 1: PURPOSE/RESEARCH MOTIVATION..................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction – The State of Cyber Operations in Geopolitics and Relation To
Industrial Control Systems/Cyber Physical Systems ................................................... 1
1.2 Research Question 1 (RQ1) .................................................................................. 9
1.3 Research Question 2 (RQ2) .................................................................................. 9
1.4 Research Question 3 (RQ3) ................................................................................ 10
1.5 Research Question 4 (RQ4) ................................................................................ 10
1.6 Solution Formation............................................................................................... 10
1.7 Thesis Organization ............................................................................................. 12
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ............................................................ 14
2.1 Electrical Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Basics ................... 14
2.2 Information Technology and Operational Technology in ICS ............................... 15
2.3 Synchrophasors and ICS ..................................................................................... 17
2.4 Incorporating Synchrophasor Data in Signature Based IDS ................................ 18

v

2.5 Historical Case Study – The Aurora Vulnerability and Remote Tripping Command
Injection Attacks......................................................................................................... 21
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PREVIOUS WORK ASSOCIATED WITH
DATASET, AND RESULTS ........................................................................................... 26
3.1 Dataset Description ............................................................................................. 26
3.2 Dataset Assumptions and Additional Information ................................................ 34
3.3 Previous Work Associated with Dataset .............................................................. 35
3.4 Data Cleaning and Initial Analysis ....................................................................... 39
3.5 Statistical Methods Approach .............................................................................. 43
3.6 Machine Learning Algorithm Approach ................................................................ 58
CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................... 83
4.1 Results/Contributions........................................................................................... 83
4.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) Results ............................................................. 85
4.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) Results ............................................................. 86
4.1.3 Research Question 3 (RQ3) Results ............................................................. 86
4.1.4 Research Question 4 (RQ4) Results ............................................................. 87
4.2 Issues/Limitations ................................................................................................ 87
4.3 Future Work ......................................................................................................... 90
APPENDIX A. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS R SCRIPTS ............................. 93

vi

APPENDIX B. INITIAL LOADING AND DATASET ANALYSIS ..................................... 99
APPENDIX C. EXPORT OF MULTICLASS DATASET ............................................... 105
APPENDIX D. INITIAL PLOTS OF AURORA DATASET ............................................ 107
APPENDIX E. INITIAL STANDARDIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND STEPWISE
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS........................................................................... 114
APPENDIX F. EASY SUBSET STANDADIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND
STEPWISE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS ....................................................... 127
APPENDIX G. EASY STANDARDIZED STEPWISE MODEL 3 AND 4 LOGISTIC
REGRESSION ............................................................................................................ 137
APPENDIX H. LOADING AND PREPROCESSING DATA IN WEKA ......................... 145
APPENDIX I. DATASET CLASSIFICATION IN WEKA ............................................... 150
APPENDIX J. RANDOMFOREST ML ALGORITHM OUTPUTS ................................. 154
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 186

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Thesis Key Task Breakdown......................................................................... 12
Figure 2 - Dataset Testbed Architecture (modified from Adhikarai et a., 2013) ............. 30
Figure 3 - Residual Plot of Initial Logistic Regression Model......................................... 46
Figure 4 - Residual Plot of Stepwise Logistic Regression Model (vars R4.PM12.I,
R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V removed) ............................................................................ 47
Figure 5 - Visual Representation of Data Subsets ........................................................ 49
Figure 6 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Initial Logistic Regression Model ........... 50
Figure 7 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model
(R2.PA4.IH removed) .................................................................................................... 51
Figure 8 - Easy Subset Logistic Regression Model 3 (with removal of R4.PM12.I,
R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V) ........................................................................................... 52
Figure 9 - Easy Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model 4 (with removal of
R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V, R4.PA12.IH, and R3.PA9.VH) ................................................ 53
Figure 10 - PCA Scree Plot ........................................................................................... 55
Figure 11 - PCA Standard Deviation and Proportion of Variance .................................. 56
Figure 12 - PCA Coefficient Output ............................................................................... 57
Figure 13 - WEKA Explorer Interface - Attribute Analysis ............................................. 62
Figure 14 - ML Approach............................................................................................... 64
Figure 15 - Training Set - Baseline ML Algorithm Accuracy Rates ................................ 65
Figure 16 - Baseline ML Algorithm - Accuracy > 95% ................................................... 67
viii

Figure 17 - 10x Cross Validation ................................................................................... 69
Figure 18 - 10x Cross Validation - >95% Accuracy ....................................................... 70
Figure 19 - Test Set - ML Algorithm Accuracy ............................................................... 73
Figure 20 - Test Set - >95% Accuracy .......................................................................... 74
Figure 21 - Test Set - Root Mean Squared Error .......................................................... 75
Figure 22 - Test Set - Precision Rates .......................................................................... 76
Figure 23 - Test Set - Recall Rates ............................................................................... 77
Figure 24 - Test Set - F-Measure Rates ........................................................................ 78
Figure 25 - Test Set - False Negative Rates ................................................................. 79
Figure 26 - ROC Curve ................................................................................................. 80

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Original Dataset Scenario Types (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) .......... 27
Table 2 - Expanded Table of Dataset Scenarios (modified form Adhikari et al., 2013) . 28
Table 3 - Attributes/Features of Dataset (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) .............. 31
Table 4 - R1 Features Breakdown (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013) ....................... 32
Table 5 - ML Algorithm Descriptions (modified from Borges-Hink et al., 2014) ............. 36
Table 6 – Initial Logistic and Stepwise Logistic Residual Comparison/AIC Values ....... 48
Table 7 - Easy Data Subset Residuals Comparison...................................................... 51
Table 8 - Easy Subset Residuals Comparison (with omission of initial logistic regression
variables) ....................................................................................................................... 53
Table 9 - WEKA ML Classification Algorithm Groups (Brownlee, 2016; Tatsis, Tjortjis,
and Tzirakis, 2013) ........................................................................................................ 63
Table 10 - Additional ML Metrics (Holmes, 2000, Borges-Hink et al., 2014; Whitten,
Date Unknown) ............................................................................................................. 71

x

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

AIC – Akaike Information Criterion
ARFF – Attribute Relation File Format
CMF – Cyber Mission Force
CPS – Cyber Physical System
CSV – Common Separated Values
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DoD – Department of Defense
HMI – Human Machine Interface
FP – False Positive
FN – False Negative
GINA – Global Information Network Architecture
ICS – Industrial Control System
ICS-CERT – Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
IDS – Intrusion Detection System
IED – Intelligent Electronic Device
IT – Information Technology
ML – Machine Learning
NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NERC-CIP – North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure
Protection
xi

NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
OT – Operational Technology
PCA – Principal Component Analysis
PDC – Phasor Data Concentrator
PLC – Programmable Logic Controller
PMU – Phasor Measurement Unit
RQ – Research Question
RTA – Russian Threat Actors
RTU – Remote Terminal Unit
NNGe – Non Nested Generalized Exemplars (nearest neighbor like ML algorithm)
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SME – Subject Matter Expert
SLR – Stepwise Logistic Regression
TT – Time Taken
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
US – United States
UTC – Universal Time Coordinated
VRDM – Vector Relational Data Modeling
WAMS – Wide Area Monitoring System (WAMS)
WAN – Wide Area Network
WEKA – Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis

xii

CHAPTER 1: PURPOSE/RESEARCH MOTIVATION

This chapter provides an overview of the concepts that will be discussed in the
body of this research. The major themes, techniques, and technologies will be
presented in a macro sense to illustrate the motivation behind the research, as well as a
synopsis and direction of the remaining sections. The majority of this introductory
section is devoted to providing the motivation and inspiration behind this work, which is
best demonstrated through an overview of the current state of geopolitics and recent
developments amongst the inextricably linked domains of the energy sector and cyber
operations. The ultimate objective of this chapter is to provide a base level of
background information to facilitate understanding of the research questions and to
demonstrate there is a credible threat looming with the potential to strike the North
American electric grid. The state of current affairs suggests this field of research is
meaningful and necessary to bolster the security of critical infrastructure in the United
States (US).

1.1 Introduction – The State of Cyber Operations in Geopolitics and Relation To
Industrial Control Systems/Cyber Physical Systems

In the past two years, the US government, military, and several private
cybersecurity organizations have published documents detailing the rising risk of
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malicious cyber operations. In 2016, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency
Response Team (ICS-CERT, an organization of the US government which falls under
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) responded to over 290 incidents, of which
59 were in the energy sector, 62 were in the communications sector, and 63 in the
critical manufacturing sector (ICS-CERT, 2016). Of note, spear phishing was present
in 26% of the incidents making it the leading access vector, and the first known
cyberattack to result in a physical impact to a power grid was observed (ICS-CERT,
2016). 2017 was by all accounts a record breaking year in that there were 159,700
reported cyber incidents, an 18.2% increase in reported breach incidents, a $5 billion
financial impact from ransomware, and a 90% rise in business targeted ransomware
(Online Trust Alliance, 2018).
With this notable increase of cyber-attacks in the civilian sector and the evolution
of state actors weaponizing cyber operations to both disrupt adversaries on the
battlefield and influence geopolitics, in 2017 the US Department of Defense (DoD)
increased the capabilities of US Cyber Command to a unified combatant command
under Title 10, which means the unit is legally capable of conducting offensive
cyberspace combat operations (Department of Defense, 2017). The need to develop
cyber capabilities has resulted in significant increases in funding and directives aimed at
growing and educating US military cyber operations personnel, or what is now referred
to as the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The CMF’s three primary missions include 1)
defending and securing DoD networks and data, 2) supporting joint military commander
objectives, and 3) defending U.S. critical infrastructure (Pomerleau, 2016).
2

The total DoD CMF is comprised of 133 teams and 6200 personnel (task
organization: 13 teams to defend the nation’s infrastructure, 68 to defend DoD
networks, 27 to provide support to combatant commanders, and 25 to provide analytic
and planning support to the teams) (Pomerleau, 2017). As indicated above, there are
significant resources and dedicated cyber defense teams being allocated to critical
infrastructure in the US. This is mirrored in Strategic Goal II of the DoD Cyber Policy
which states, “Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from
disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence” (Department of
Defense, 2015). The thirteen teams tasked with defense of the nation’s infrastructure
face a multitude of threats, of which many are focused on the denial of essential
services to the populace.
In addition to cyber operations being a powerful overt and conventional weapon
during open conflict between nation states, disruption of essential services such as
water, electricity, and natural gas can be wielded by adversarial nations as a tool to
erode trust in a government’s legitimacy and ability to provide for its citizens. The cyber
dimension adds layers of complexity due to difficulties in proving decisive attribution to a
particular actor. In a way that mirrors what many pundits feel was malicious intent
exhibited through likely nation state interference in the 2016 US Presidential elections, a
possible ultimate goal of a malicious actor is to decrease citizens’ faith in the system
itself, rather than the immediate effect of denying services to the population. However,
the denial of essential services such as electricity would also likely have severe
economic implications due to reliance on electrically powered devices that form the
3

foundation of local business, and undoubtedly greatly affect the lives of citizens reliant
on personal devices.
There is evidence to suggest that Russia has conducted a proof of concept of
this type of attack by depriving essential services in the Ukraine via a cyber vector in
2015 and 2016 that denied power to close to half a million Ukrainians (Greenberg,
2017). These events could potentially be a proof of concept or test bed for future
engagements with nations that have greater cybersecurity capabilities/risk mitigation
(Greenberg, 2017). Denial or disruption of electricity could be used in concert with
combat operations against a conventional opponent but could potentially be more
effective against the civilian population to sow seeds of distrust and doubt about the
efficacy of the government in responsibility of the affected region. This could be seen
as a larger campaign to erode citizens faith in the targeted government. In any case,
there is an immense need to classify attacks against the power grid quickly and with a
high degree of accuracy to identify malicious activity early and mitigate
damage/disruption of critical infrastructure and essential services.
The delivery of these essential services is made possible by Industrial Control
Systems (ICS), which is a general term applied to control systems found in industrial
sectors/critical infrastructure (NIST, 2015). ICS are comprised of myriad interoperating
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components that act
together to achieve an industrial objective and facilitate distribution of services to the
population (NIST, 2015; Murphy, 2017). This interoperation has multiple potential
issues; first, there are systems that are interacting that were not initially designed to do
4

so; second, many of these interactions with legacy systems have outdated or unpatched
security protocols; and third, is that there are generally conflicting interests between IT
and OT processes/personnel, in which the OT side (usually comprised of engineers and
management) are concerned with delivering service to a customer and the IT side
(primarily comprised of cybersecurity or IT personnel) being concerned with security
(and keeping systems and software updated to facilitate that security) (Murphy, 2017).
There is a natural divide as reliability and security can often collide and decisions must
be made that could hinder either side. There are of course ramifications if either is
neglected indefinitely, or if management consistently prioritizes one over the other
(Murphy, 2017). This dichotomy of competing interests can lead to vulnerabilities in the
system that can in turn be potentially exploited by sophisticated threat actors. While
these threats have been present for many years, recent events on the global stage
suggest such as the Ukrainian energy sector attacks that “potential” ICS vulnerabilities
have been exploited by state sponsored actors via cyber operations.
In the past three months, there has been increasing evidence to suggest
that a nation state has infiltrated the North American power grid and has the potential to
execute malicious follow on operations. This was shown in recent testimony in which
the Secretary of the Department of Energy Rick Perry testified at a congressional
hearing that there has undoubtedly been Russian infiltration in the North American
power grid (Grandoni, 2018). The United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) echoed this congressional testimony in a publicly acknowledged
(which is a new precedent) joint technical alert spearheaded by the Department of
5

Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Alert TA18-07A
(Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure
Sectors). The alert warned of an ongoing multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian
Threat Actors (RTA) and that the group has moved laterally throughout peripheral and
target networks and are actively conducting network reconnaissance and information
regarding North American ICS infrastructure (US-CERT, 2018).
The US-CERT report detailed that this campaign had been active since at least
March of 2016, and that in addition to the energy sector, targeting also occurred in the
nuclear, water, aviation, and other critical manufacturing sectors (US-CERT, 2018). The
campaign was executed via the use of common tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) such as spear-phishing, staging of malware, and credential gathering, and initial
victims were peripheral organizations with less secure networks but with access to the
intended targets networks, which were then subsequently targeted (US-CERT, 2018).
Additionally, common ICS trade publication/informational websites were modified to
include malicious content with the ultimate goal of gaining credentials by compromising
the peripheral organizations and an end goal of compromising an ICS organizational
network and thus ICS infrastructure (US-CERT, 2018). Once the intended target
network was infiltrated, there were multiple observations of workstations and servers
being accessed that contained data output from control systems within ICS facilities
(US-CERT, 2018). Files including (but not limited to) the configuration of systems within
a specific ICS environment and Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) were accessed by the
threat actor, indicating a high level of sophistication and information gain from the
6

campaign including reconstructed screenshots of exploited HMI accessed by RTA (USCERT, 2018). While obtaining these screen captures, in at least one instance RTA
used a logical format and naming convention that indicated the machine description,
machine location, and organization name (Symantec, 2017). Additionally, a string of
“cntrl” was noted in some machine descriptions, potentially marking the machine as
those the RTA has gained access to (Symantec, 2017).
Leadership from prominent cybersecurity research organizations in the private
sector have concurred with these assessments by the US government, with Eric Chien,
a security technology director at Symantec stating in reference to Russia, “We now
have evidence they’re sitting on the machines, connected to industrial control
infrastructure, that allow them to effectively turn the power off or effect sabotage,”
(Perlroth and Sanger, 2018). A report from Symantec named the group of attacks the
Dragonfly and Dragonfly 2.0 campaigns and asserts that RTA have been in operation
since at least 2011, with possible attributions/involvement in notable energy sector
attacks such as the 2015 and 2016 Ukraine power grid attacks mentioned above
(Symantec, 2017). Although the extent and scope of the infiltration of the North
American grid by RTA is unknown, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the
group is focused on gaining access to operational systems within the energy sector
which could in turn be used to disrupt essential services (Symantec, 2017).
Therefore, both government and private sector entities concur, based off the
most recent evidence, that there exists a high likelihood that the systems which regulate
and provide electricity on the North American Electric Grid have been compromised by
7

RTA. If ICS networks have already been compromised (which is assumed in the
dataset utilized in this work), the US is already in a reactionary state. However, there is
still a need to understand when an attack is occurring as quickly as possible to
decrease the severity and reduce impacts to the population. The use of synchrophasor
technology and measurements via sensors will be explored in later sections (as it
comprises the majority of data in the dataset) and should be a key tenant in a hybrid
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) comprised of both physical processes within ICS and
the network/cyber component to quickly discern between attacks and normal
operational conditions and thus mitigate damage to the greatest extent possible.
To aid in the classification of attacks against ICS, a specific type of attack that
has the propensity to disrupt the power grid through the exploitation of components
associated with a generator, referred to as a remote tripping command injection attack,
will be analyzed and modeled in the remaining sections of this work. The purpose of this
research is to utilize statistical and/or machine learning methods to develop detection
axioms for this type of attack via the analysis of variables (and parameters of variable
values) in an open source dataset, and ultimately contribute to the formulation of an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to thwart attacks employed against ICS. After finding
an appropriate open source dataset, email communication with one of the dataset
authors (Dr. Tommy Morris), indicated there was a dearth of open source research
focused purely on detection of remote tripping command injection attacks (to his
knowledge and further confirmed via the search of numerous academic journal
databases), and thus was identified as an area in which the author could contribute to
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the existing body of knowledge (Morris, 2018). The utilization of simple methods was
identified as a logical starting point to achieve baseline results and were applied prior to
application of more sophisticated machine learning (ML) methods. This research is
focused on identifying a specific type of attack against the power grid with the highest
accuracy possible, which could then potentially be utilized in the construction of a hybrid
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) utilizing synchrophasor measurements in ICS. The
following research questions were thus developed to focus this thesis and facilitate
solution formation.

1.2 Research Question 1 (RQ1)

Can the simple statistical methods of Logistic Regression, Stepwise Logistic
Regression, or Principal Component Analysis classify remote tripping command
injection attacks on electrical grids at 95% or greater accuracy?

1.3 Research Question 2 (RQ2)

Can machine learning methods classify remote tripping command injection
attacks on electrical grids at 95% or greater accuracy?
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1.4 Research Question 3 (RQ3)

If RQ1 or RQ2 is true, can detection axioms be derived from this data for
implementation in an IDS in future work?

1.5 Research Question 4 (RQ4)

In future work can these axioms/results be implemented in a Global Information
Network Architecture (GINA) based IDS?

1.6 Solution Formation

Through an analysis of the Aurora event to define and explain a remote tripping
command injection attack and a synthesized dataset (created by Mississippi State
University and Oak Ridge National Laboratory and modified by the author to incorporate
only remote tripping command injection attacks and normal operational data points) to
analyze remote tripping command injection attack and normal operational data, the
author will develop detection axioms based off confirmed relationships in the data
utilizing statistical/ML methods. It should be noted, that the original direction/goal of this
thesis was to utilize GINA, a vector relational data modeling (VRDM) approach to
10

classify the data via multi-attribute scripts within the system to further analyze/classify
remote tripping command injection attacks (and possibly compare/contrast the metrics
of statistical/ML methods to determine which method yields better results). Key to this
utilization of GINA was the development of detection axioms which could be described
as algorithms/rules to determine whether a given instance in the dataset was an attack
or normal operations. These detection axioms/rules would form the basis of a
conceptual model for integration into the GINA framework. Although GINA
implementation was not realized in the course of the research largely due to the
complexity of the dataset and time taken to analyze it, there is evidence to suggest that
GINA could be incorporated in future work. The timeline/methodology below in Figure 1
demonstrates the key task breakdown for the research and a general synopsis of each
task as originally envisioned and briefed to thesis advisory committee on 22FEB18.

11

Figure 1 - Thesis Key Task Breakdown

1.7 Thesis Organization

The sections are organized as follows to facilitate understanding of this thesis:
Section II consists of background information regarding ICS and Cyber Physical
Systems (CPS), the Aurora Vulnerability and implications of remote tripping command
injection attacks, and synchrophasor technology and its integration into IDS. Section III
focuses on the synthesis and modification of the dataset, previous work associated with
the dataset, statistical methodology/approaches utilized with results, and the ML
12

methodology/approaches utilized with results. Section IV summarizes the results and
conclusions about utilization of more sophisticated methods to classify attacks given the
dataset, issues/limitations of the research, and possible future work associated with this
research.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This section provides the reader with the basic concepts of electrical power
generation and the various machinery/components that make it possible, the concept of
Information Technology (IT) vs Operational Technology (OT) in an electrical grid
context, synchrophasor technology, and a review the Aurora Event and remote tripping
command injection attacks.

2.1 Electrical Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Basics

Alternating current electricity fed into the grid can generally be categorized into
generation, transmission, and distribution (NERC, 2013). Generation through some
form of energy (coal, gas, nuclear, etc.) occurs, and electricity is then transported
across a series of high-voltage transmission and lower-voltage distribution lines to reach
approximately 334 million people in homes and businesses in North America (NERC,
2013). A key component of the grid are transformers that step up electric voltage at
generating stations for efficient transport and then step down voltage at substations to
safely deliver low voltage electricity to customers (NERC, 2013).
Electricity flows through substations via bus to a circuit breaker that connects
transmissions lines to a transformer and/or a generator to facilitate electricity
distribution. Substations are connected via transmission lines, which as mentioned
14

above, contain the machinery and ability to step up and step down power to facilitate
transmission and distribution (NERC, 2013). Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, various components of substations have become networked to facilitate
operations, and thus the grid can be thought of as containing both IT components that
interact with OT components.

2.2 Information Technology and Operational Technology in ICS

Major issues between the IT and OT subsets of ICS involve a lack of common
terms and understanding of components (and their associated personnel), and also the
end goals of what each seeks to preserve. These end goals could be simplified for the
OT side as focused on reliability, and for the IT side as focused on security (Murphy,
2017). While these two sides are not diametrically opposed in most cases, something
such as a patching of an operator interface during peak hours would potentially be
considered unacceptable from the OT perspective, as it is inherent (at least in the
norms regarding essential services in the US) that power must be constant and reliable.
Given the great reliance on devices powered by traditional forms of power generation
(i.e., the grid as opposed to solar), this could be catastrophic to businesses and local
economics.
This focus is best exemplified by the two Reliability Concepts put forth by the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The first is adequacy, which is
15

defined as “the ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electrical demand
and energy requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account
scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements” (NERC,
2013). The second is operating reliability, defined as “the ability of the bulk-power
system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electricity short circuits or
unanticipated loss of system elements from credible contingencies, while avoiding
uncontrolled cascading blackouts or damage to equipment”, in which the bulk-power
system refers to all electric generation and transmission components and their
associated control systems (NERC, 2013). Note, that the emphasis seems skewed to
supply demand of electricity at all times, and that there is nothing regarding security of
the system or any type of risk mitigation regarding shutdowns due to
physical/cybersecurity concerns.
The interaction between IT and OT components in modern ICS is ubiquitous and
necessary to provide essential services to the population. However, this
interconnectivity produces vulnerabilities in ICS network architecture that can be
exploited. This will be further explored in Section 2.5 which describes the Aurora
vulnerability and Section 3.1 which provides information on the testbed architecture
used to produce the dataset utilized in this research.
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2.3 Synchrophasors and ICS

As the vast majority of features/attributes from the dataset are synchrophasor or
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) measurements, the following section will provide
more information about how the technology works, the case for utilizing synchrophasor
technology, and what the measurements mean.
Electrical transmission systems composed of lines, breakers, and transformers
form the basis for transmitting electricity from generators across long distances to load
centers (Pan, Morris, Adhikari, March 2015). With the increasingly connected nature of
IT and OT components within ICS infrastructure, synchrophasor technology such as
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are being utilized to serve as sensors to various
processes occurring during transmission (Pan et al., March 2015). The sensors are
capable of monitoring real-time magnitude and phase of voltage, magnitude and phase
of currents, and frequency of the system in a synchronized manner (Crappe, 2008).
This synchronization allows an evaluation of the stability of power system network, load
distribution calculations, and fault detections/locations (Crappe, 2008). The PMU data
is time stamped with Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) via Global Positions Systems
signals, and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) collect said data and transmit data to a
control center via Wide Area Network (WAN) (Pan et al., March 2015). The PMU
measurements are aggregated through a device called a Phasor Data Concentrator
(PDC), which then sends said data to OpenPDC software that sorts and processes the
data for operator analysis (Morris, 2018). The overall system is called a Wide Area
17

Monitoring System (WAMS), and through this synchrophasor technology it is possible to
measure transmission rates (comprised of multiple measurements of multiple systems)
at a much higher rate than traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems (30 to 120 samples per second for WAMS, as opposed to 1 sample
every several seconds for SCADA) (Pan et al., March 2015). In addition to the increase
of sampling rate, this method of obtaining measurements is extremely precise and
exhibits very low error rates (Crappe, 2008). The dataset utilized in this research is a
time series of synchrophasor measurements in which all changes/variations in a given
scenario are reflected via PMU data and also reflects the IT domain via device logs in
the testbed architecture (such as SNORT) (See section 3.1 for a detailed description of
the dataset).

2.4 Incorporating Synchrophasor Data in Signature Based IDS

Due to the complex interactions between multiple components on both the IT and
OT side, ICS and CPS (computational systems that monitor and control physical
systems including but not limited to control systems, sensor-based system, and
autonomous systems in an ICS), security is a complicated and unique challenge that
requires interdisciplinary expertise and teamwork to properly mitigate threats (Redwood,
2016). There is often a lack of communication between IT and OT components due to
restricted access and security review protocols that decrease the IT side from
understanding the full specifications and inherent risks of a given CPS (Murphy, 2017).
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The most widely used IDS systems in CPS (and thus ICS) are Network Based IDS
(NIDS), which primarily rely on signature based and anomaly based detection (Host
Based IDS (HIDS) are used rarely in CPS due to resource limitations on individual ICS
components and the overall complexity of CPS) (Redwood, 2016)
Signature based intrusion detection is not necessarily limited to IT components,
as there are often physical indicators in OT components as to when an attack is
occurring (Redwood, 2016). The benefit of utilizing an approach that focuses on sensor
readings and physical measurements is ultimately that attacks can be detected
regardless of the properties, stage, or attack vector (Redwood, 2016). Despite
exploitation on the cyber level, many specific attacks leave indications of malicious
intent in a synchrophasor through electric current events or significant changes in
voltage. This has been demonstrated through research analyzing a brief power quality
event in April 2015 with significant voltage sag, which was assessed and a likely source
identified via PMU readings that would have been impossible to detect with legacy
SCADA systems due to sampling rates (Jamei, Stewart, Peisert, Scaglione, McParland,
Roberts, and McEachern, 2016).
Accurately defined signature based models formed on detection axioms/rules
could be integrated into a hybrid IDS comprised of both IT and OT monitoring
components and provide representations of acceptable system behavior and also detect
anomalous or malicious activity. Previous research in the domain suggests that
signature based rules are an integral component of a more comprehensive hybrid
Synchrophasor Specific IDS (SS-IDS) comprised of both IT and OT component
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monitoring (based on recommendations from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (Khan, Albalushi, McLaughlin, Laverty, and Sezer, 2018; NIST,
2010). Of note, the research in this work is specifically focused on phasor
measurement values as opposed to other features that could be measured in a SS-IDS
(Khan, Albalushi, McLaughlin, Laverty, and Sezer, 2018; NIST, 2010).
Jamei et al. also proposed a synchrophasor based hybrid IDS (PMU-IDS), of
which rules based physical constraints are employed to draw conclusions about the
state of security in various levels of the grid. This is specifically referenced in what the
authors refer to as Stage 1, in which signatures of anomalies are detected in via phasor
measurement variables similar to those used in this work (Jamei et al., 2016). It should
be noted that because signature based rules are derived from known and analyzed
instances in a dataset, that values which are attacks that are outside of the attack
parameters determined by analysis will not be detected. Despite the potential
limitations of the signature based model approach for a hybrid IDS, the method can
establish rules that can provide a baseline for this specific type of attack which can be
verified with further testing. This work provides signature based intrusion detection
axioms/rules of remote tripping command injection attacks developed via statistical/ML
analysis of physical synchrophasor measurements.
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2.5 Historical Case Study – The Aurora Vulnerability and Remote Tripping
Command Injection Attacks

In 2007, the US Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory conducted an
experiment known as the Aurora Event or Aurora Vulnerability that displayed the
vulnerabilities of generators connected to the electric grid (Zeller, February 2011). This
experiment demonstrated that an attack consisting of falsified commands over
compromised communication networks could have severe ramifications on the
distribution of power through the exploitation of a generator (Srivastava, Ernster, Pan,
2013). By intentionally opening and closing a breaker out of synchronism, the resulting
high electrical current and torque were translated to high stress on the mechanical shaft
of a generator which ultimately led to its destruction (Zeller, February 2011). The
exploitation of this vulnerability is referred to as a remote tripping command injection
attack and will be further analyzed in Section 3.
A basic understanding of generators is necessary to display the nuances of this
attack. Generators are comprised of a magnet spinning inside a tightly wound coil of
wire (also referred to as a winding or turn) which produces an electrical charge and
magnetic field (electromagnetism) (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 101). If one of the wires (a
conductor) moves through the magnetic field it produces electrical pressure in the wire,
and the magnetic field acts a force resisting its movement (Barnett and Bjornsgaard,
101). The energy required to push the wire through the magnetic field is equal to the
electric energy generated in the wire minus the energy lost in the conversion, and thus
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mechanical work is converted into electricity (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 102). The
major safety feature that prevents overstress of a generator is a circuit breaker (Barnett
and Bjornsgaard, 107). A circuit breaker de-energizes components in an attempt to
mitigate damage should an overload, high temperature, or other faults occur (Barnett
and Bjornsgaard, 107). This mechanical work and friction from rotating parts in
generators is the basic principle, and the knowledge of circuit breakers relationship to
this mechanical force was exploited to facilitate a successful attack.
Protective relays in a power system monitor both the generator and main network
power systems and have an intentional delay which are designed to protect the system
by isolating faulty parts and preventing unnecessary tripping of power components
during short period transient time (Srivastava et al., 2013). The delay results in a small
window where no protection is available (Srivastava et al., 2013 and Zeller, February
2011). Aurora attacks are designed to open the circuit breaker, wait for the generator to
be out of synchronism, and then reclose the circuit breaker before the relay protection
system identifies the anomaly (Zeller, February 2011). Through the research conducted
by M. Zeller, it was determined that less than 15 of these cycles are required to launch
an attack on traditional generator protection elements. This attack can be executed
either locally or remotely depending on the topology of the substation communication
networks (Srivastava et al., 2013).
While this type of attack is possible of being executed by a threat actor that has
significant resources and capabilities, it is unlikely that threat actors of lesser resources
and/or skill would be able to successful implement this type of attack (Zeller, April
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2011). Also, there are varying degrees of generator (and ultimately ICS) vulnerability
based on numerous risk factors (Zeller, April 2011). For example, communications
protocols between the breakers and relays and the PMU can be compromised, relay
communications ports can be hacked (often utilizing default passwords/usernames),
and malicious programs can be embedded into the relay which initiate at a set time or
condition (Zeller, April 2011). These possible vulnerabilities indicate that there are
multiple attack surfaces in a given generator that could make it susceptible to this type
of attack, and also demonstrate the immense complexity of safeguarding ICS
architecture (Zeller, April 2011).
It should be noted that the Aurora Vulnerability can be mitigated through sound
cybersecurity practices at the organizational level and proper configuration of equipment
in an ICS environment (Salmon, Zeller, Guzman, Mynam, and Donolo, 2009). Proper
configuration in this context refers to setting and maintaining robust generator protection
schemes during both normal and faulted conditions, which for this specific type of attack
includes disabling logic/protective elements preventing fast open/close operations of a
breaker/relay (Salmon, Zeller, Guzman, Mynam, and Donolo, 2009). Generator
protection schemes are often not enough to thwart this attack alone due to the fact that
the attack is not initiated at the generator itself and is aimed at the exploitation of a node
connected to the generator but not under the purview of its protection scheme (Zeller,
April 2011). Additionally, possible lapses in signal processing speed or intentional
design of the system by engineers to smooth the signal via filtering and keeping the
system connected opens a window for attack by limiting the relay to recognize sudden
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changes in the system that might indicate malicious activity (Zeller, April 2011).
Although there are ways to mitigate this vulnerability, there appear to be a limited
number of utility organizations that have employed updated security measures given the
amount of time and effort required to update legacy systems and the focus on providing
consistent services at the expense of security (Swearingen, Brunasso, Weiss, and
Huber, 2013). Given the lack of incorporating mitigation factors to lessen the risk, this
type of attack is still a viable and credible vulnerability that could be exploited by a wellfunded/resourced threat actor.
It is also interesting to note the disclosure timeline for the Aurora Vulnerability, in
which initial disclosure began in 2008 to affected domains but that all associated
documents were released by DHS accidentally after a Freedom of Information Request
inquiring about a non-related malware campaign called Operation Aurora in 2014
(Waltman, 2016; Murphy, 2017). Based on this, there appears to be a lack of
information sharing at least to the public if not to the broader energy sector. While there
are certainly security implications of sharing this type of attack with the public, there are
many potentially harmful repercussions given the prevalence of generators across
multiple domains/industries. Although not directly related, information sharing regarding
attacks could also be discouraged by the shift of the electric power industry from
regulated utilities to a more open marketplace to foster competition amongst utility
companies via deregulation through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Barnett and
Bjornsgaard, 51 and 226). There are numerous requirements of energy companies
including designing facilities, attaining all permits, adhering to maintenance/operational
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and repair procedures, all of which are significant endeavors (Barnett and Bjornsgaard,
226). Information sharing is likely not high on the priority list, and actually might allow
for a rival company to have a competitive advantage (Barnett and Bjornsgaard, 226).
While the need for information sharing for the collective security of critical infrastructure
is undoubtedly required, the conditions do not make it likely. Therefore, there is a need
for independent research be conducted on open source datasets to better understand
and analyze existing attack data. These findings could then be published and have the
potential to help multiple affected parties without removing the financial incentives or
competitive advantages of said organizations.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PREVIOUS WORK ASSOCIATED WITH
DATASET, AND RESULTS

This section describes the dataset and methodology utilized to analyze and
classify remote tripping command injection attacks on the electrical grid given both
physical measurements and traditional cyber logs. The approach below began with the
utilization of statistical methods to better understand the dataset and determine if
simple/straight forward statistical methods could be applied with a high degree of
accuracy and facilitate the construction of detection axioms. After this statistical
approach was applied without yielding successful results, a ML approach aligned with
previous work associated with the original dataset was applied with success in
classification of remote tripping command injection attacks.

3.1 Dataset Description

After an exhaustive search and consultation with SMEs in the domain, the author
found an open source ICS attack dataset that incorporated both IT and OT attributes.
This dataset was created in a joint collaboration between researchers at Mississippi
State University and Oak Ridge National Laboratories and is the only dataset that could
be identified that represented OT in the form of synchrophasor data, and also common
IT data such as SNORT logs (Adhikari, Pan, Morris, Borges-Hink, and Beaver, 2014).
Having both IT and OT components in the dataset was important as GINA excels at
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analysis of data from multiple domains and is also more indicative of hybrid IDS in ICS
environments which take into consideration multiple streams of data to analyze the
system state (Anderson, 2018 and Redwood, 2018). The initial dataset contained
fifteen sets of data in the CSV/ARFF format comprised of six groups of power system
event scenarios representing natural events, no events (or normal operational
conditions), and attack events (see table below; Adhikari et al., 2014).

Table 1 - Original Dataset Scenario Types (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013)

Type of Scenario
Short Circuit Fault

Line Maintenance
Attack – Remote Tripping Command
Injection
Attack – Relay Setting Change

Attack – Data Injection

Normal Operations

Description
A short at a various location in a
power line; location indicated by
percentage range (see table below
for further clarification)
Normal maintenance (not attack
behavior) disables one or more
relays on a specific line
Attacker sends command to relay
which causes breakers to open;
Aurora Vulnerability
Attacker changes setting of distance
protection scheme on relay so that
said relay will not trip for a valid
fault/command
Attacker changes values such as
current, or voltage to imitate valid
faults (goal is to blind operator and
cause black out)
Self-explanatory

From these major groups there is a total of thirty-seven scenarios, further
explained by the table below (scenario numbers 31-34 were not used in the numbering
convention). Scenarios 15-20 (Remote Tripping Command Injection Attacks) and 41
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(Normal Operational Conditions) were isolated from the original dataset and used for
the analysis in this section and future sections of this research.
Table 2 - Expanded Table of Dataset Scenarios (modified form Adhikari et al., 2013)

Scenario Number

Description

Type

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Fault from 10-19% on Line 1
Fault from 20-79% on Line 1
Fault from 80-90% on Line 1
Fault from 10-19% on Line 2
Fault from 20-79% on Line 2
Fault from 80-90% on Line 2
Fault from 10-19% on Line 1 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Fault from 20-79% on Line 1 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Fault from 80-90% on Line 1 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Fault from 10-19% on Line 2 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Fault from 20-79% on Line 2 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Fault from 80-90% on Line 2 w/ tripping
command – data injection
Line 1 maintenance
Line 2 maintenance
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R1
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R2
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R3
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R4
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R1 and R2
Remote Tripping Command Injection to
R3 and R4
Fault from 10-19% on Line 1 with R1
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 20-90% on Line 1 with R1
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R2
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 50-79% on Line 1 with R2
disabled and fault – relay setting change

Natural
Natural
Natural
Natural
Natural
Natural
Attack

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

28

Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Natural
Natural
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack

Scenario Number

Description

Type
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Fault from 80-90% on Line 1 with R2
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 10-19% on Line 2 with R3
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 20-49% on Line 2 with R3
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 50-90% on Line 2 with R3
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 10-79% on Line 2 with R4
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Fault from 80-90% on Line 2 with R4
disabled and fault – relay setting change
Scenario Number Not Used
Scenario Number Not Used
Scenario Number Not Used
Scenario Number Not Used
Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R1 and
R2 disabled and fault – relay setting
change
Fault from 50-90% on Line 1 with R1 and
R2 disabled and fault – relay setting
change
Fault from 10-49% on Line 1 with R3 and
R4 disabled and fault – relay setting
change
Fault from 50-90% on Line 1 with R3 and
R4 disabled and fault – relay setting
change
L1 maintenance with R1 and R2 disabled
– relay setting change
L1 maintenance with R1 and R2 disabled
– relay setting change
Normal operational load changes

Attack

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Attack

Attack

Attack

Attack

Attack
Attack
Natural

The power system configuration utilized to generate the data is represented
below and is referred to as a 3 bus 2 generator system. As indicated in the graphic
below, the primary components consist of generators (represented by G), breakers
(represented by BR), and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) (utilized to switch
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breakers on/off, represented by R, controls like numbered breaker (i.e., R1 controls
BR1)).

Figure 2 - Dataset Testbed Architecture (modified from Adhikarai et a., 2013)

For the original multiclass dataset, data was populated into the ARFF format,
which encompassed fifteen datasets comprised of approximately 5,000 data entries
each. These data are composed of 128 features or variables that are primarily sourced
from phasor measurement units (PMUs) or synchrophasors. The data was measured at
120 samples per second, and each scenario was simulated for 17 seconds, which
equates to each row representing 8.3 milliseconds in a CSV file (Morris, 2018).
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The tables below explain the 128 measurements that comprise the dataset. In
accordance with the power system configuration diagram, there are 4 PMUs, each
associated with one relay which produce 29 measurements (4PMUs x 29Measurements
= 116 Measurements). The remaining twelve variables are binary data associated with
control panel, relay, and SNORT logs. The final column is the marker/class (see tables
below): the first table shows the naming convention for all features, and the second
table is a detailed naming convention for R1 features (R1 is the only relay represented
for simplicity below; the same convention is used for R2-R4)).

Table 3 - Attributes/Features of Dataset (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013)

Feature (note, R1-4 will precede in raw
dataset)
PA1:VH-PA3:VH

Description

PM1:V-PM3:V

Phase A-C Voltage Phase

Phase A-C Voltage Phase Angle

Magnitude
PA4:IH-PA6IH

Phase A-C Current Phase Angle

PM4:I-PM6:I

Phase A-C Current Phase
Magnitude

PA7:VH-PA9:VH

Pos.-Neg.-Zero Voltage Phase
Angle

PM7:V-PM9:V

Pos.-Neg.-Zero Voltage Phase
Magnitude
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Feature (note, R1-4 will precede in raw
dataset)
PA10:VH-PA12:VH

Description
Pos.-Neg.-Zero Current Phase
Angle

PM10:V-PM12:V

Pos.-Neg.-Zero Current Phase
Magnitude

F

Frequency for relays

DF

Frequency Delta (df/dt) for relays

PA:Z

Appearance Impedance for relays

PA:ZH

Appearance Impedance Angle for
relays

S

Status Flag for relays

control_panel_log1

Self-explanatory; binary data

relay1_log

Self-explanatory; binary data

snort_log1

Self-explanatory; binary data

Table 4 - R1 Features Breakdown (modified from Adhikari et al., 2013)

Feature

Description

R1-PA1:VH

R1 Phase A Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PM1:V

R1 Phase A Voltage Phase
Magnitude
R1 Phase B Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PA2:VH
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Feature

Description

R1-PM2:V

R1 Phase B Voltage Phase
Magnitude
R1 Phase C Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PA3:VH
R1-PM3:V

R1 Phase C Voltage Phase
Magnitude
R1 Phase A Current Phase Angle

R1-PA4:IH
R1-PM4:I

R1 Phase A Current Phase
Magnitude
R1 Phase B Current Phase Angle

R1-PA5:IH
R1-PM5:I

R1 Phase B Current Phase
Magnitude
R1 Phase C Current Phase Angle

R1-PA6:IH
R1-PM6:I
R1-PA7:VH

R1 Phase C Current Phase
Magnitude
R1 Pos. Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PM7:V

R1 Pos. Voltage Phase Magnitude

R1-PA8:VH

R1 Neg. Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PM8:V

R1 Neg. Voltage Phase Magnitude

R1-PA9:VH

R1 Zero Voltage Phase Angle

R1-PM9:V

R1 Zero Voltage Phase Magnitude

R1-PA10:VH

R1 Pos. Voltage Current Phase
Angle
R1 Pos. Voltage Current Phase
Magnitude
R1 Neg. Voltage Current Phase
Angle
R1 Neg. Voltage Current Phase
Magnitude
R1 Zero Voltage Current Phase
Angle
R1 Zero Voltage Current Phase
Magnitude

R1-PM10:V
R1-PA11:VH
R1-PM11:V
R1-PA12:VH
R1-PM12:V
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Feature

Description

R1-F
R1-DF

R1 frequency for relay
R1 frequency delta (df/dt) for relay

R1-PA:Z

R1 appearance impedance for relay

R1-PA:ZH

R1 appearance impedance angle
for relay
R1 status flag for relay

R1:S

3.2 Dataset Assumptions and Additional Information

The first major assumption of the dataset is that the IT network has been
breached by an adversary (as indicated by Figure 2 above). Also of note, IEDs cannot
determine if a command to open/close breakers has been issued from an adversary due
to a lack of internal validation (Adhikari et al., 2014). Therefore, opening/closing
breakers will not be detected as malicious as there is not a mechanism to determine
where the command is coming from (i.e., from an operator or from an adversary)
(Adhikari et al., 2014). In the testbed architecture, SNORT was monitoring only whether
a packet had been sent to trip, and a single packet could be a legitimate command if
observed by both SNORT and the overall Energy Management System from an
operator (Morris, 2018). If only SNORT observed the packet however, this would
indicate an attack had been initiated by an adversary (Morris, 2018). Additionally, to
provide detailed and specific analysis of remote tripping command injection attacks,

34

only remote tripping command injection attack data and normal operational data was
considered during analysis (see Section 3.4 for modification details).

3.3 Previous Work Associated with Dataset

In the next section regarding work associated with this dataset, the article that is
most directly related to this work is entitled Machine Learning Power System and Cyber
Attack Discrimination and Classification of Disturbances (Borges-Hink, Beaver,
Buckner, Morris, Adhikari, and Pan, 2014). In this article, the original dataset was
utilized in its original form with all scenarios. The research methodology and results
from Borges-Hink et al. most directly impacted the ML methodology outlined in Section
3.6.
The authors theorized in this work that ML algorithms in the open source
software Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) could “leverage nonlinear complex relationships between power system measurements and be able to
discriminate between malicious, non-malicious, and normal disturbances” (Borges-Hink
et al., 2014). Utilizing 10-fold cross validation and 90/10 train/test split, a series of ML
classification algorithms were applied to the dataset including OneR, NNGe , Random
Forests, Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines (SVM), JRipper, and
Adaboost+JRipper (see table below, Borges-Hink et al., 2014).
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Table 5 - ML Algorithm Descriptions (modified from Borges-Hink et al., 2014)

ML Algorithm Name

Description

OneR

A simple learner that evaluates each
features’ optimum rule and chooses
best from all feature sets

NNGe

Nearest neighbor like algorithm that
compares new examples to
surrounding datapoints

Random Forests

Tree predictors cast a vote for most
popular class/input of new instance

Naïve-Bayes

Probabilistic classifier based on
Bayes theorem

Support Vector Machines

Algorithm that classifies classes
based on hyper planes that
maximize margin between classes

JRipper

Incremental reduced error pruning
algorithm that uses a separate and
conquer methodology

Adaboost

Adaptive boosting; improves
performance of a base algorithm
based on misclassification of
previous training examples
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A comparison of these learners across the dataset was illustrated via the
plotting of metrics including accuracy, recall, precision, and F-Measure, and results
indicated that JRipper+Adaboost had the highest accuracy across all metrics
(approximately 95%) (Borges-Hink et al., 2014). The authors state the high
performance of JRipper+Adaboost was likely due to its tree-based approach to rule
generation and the addition of a mechanism to focus on misclassification of previous
data (Borges-Hink et al., 2014). It should be noted that while classification was
successful regarding differentiation between disturbances and attacks, the ML
algorithms were not able to classify specific fault and attack types within each larger
scenario category (Pan, Morris, and Adhikari, 2015). Also, while the research
conducted by Borges-Hink et al. explores classification of the entire dataset and
associated scenarios, it does not specifically address classification of individual
scenarios such as specific types of attacks.
Although not directly utilizing the dataset in this work, a related article entitled An
Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious SCADA Communications
details a similar application of the same ML algorithms (with the addition of J48, a
decision tree algorithm) to readings from remote terminal units (RTU) in another ICS
environment, a gas pipeline system (Borges-Hink, Beaver, Buckner, Morris, Adhikari,
and Pan, 2013). This work included normal operational observations and also
observations of similar attacks to the remote tripping command injection attack including
an Illegal Process ID Attack, in which a malicious command is sent to a Programmable
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Logic Controller (PLC) to modify performance, but also included other types of
command injection attacks such as manipulation of the setpoint of the pipeline pressure
valve, and also command injection attacks that dealt primarily with manipulating
outgoing commands in the system to acquire information (address and function scans)
(Borges-Hink et al., 2013). However, it must be mentioned that the dataset structures
are not similar, with instances of normal operations (28,086) and command injection
attacks (257, of which only 49 are similar to a remote tripping command injection)
utilized in Borges-Hink et al. being very different than the dataset utilized in this work
(8,737 instances of remote tripping command injection attacks, 4,405 instances of
normal operations) (Borges-Hink et al., 2013).
While this difference could have an impact on the comparative findings, the major
takeaways from this work are still interesting to note. The article echoes previous
findings that attacks and normal operations have higher classification rates in binary
datasets than multiclass datasets (Borges-Hink et al., 2013). The work also identified
the highest accuracy classifiers as nearest neighbor algorithms (NNGe) and decision
tree algorithms (Random Forests) (Borges-Hink et al., 2013). The NNGe ML algorithm
utilizes non-nested generalized exemplars, which are defined as examples of a dataset
stored in memory that instead of being stored verbatim are merged with like examples
which reduces storage in memory and thus reduces classification time, a common issue
that compounds with a growing dataset and ultimately can render the exemplar
database useless due to lack of memory capacity or untenable times for classification
(Martin, 1995). This improvement to the nearest neighbor algorithm was proven to
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increase classification performance by an average of 2.6% over standard nearest
neighbor algorithms and also reduces classification time by 62% due to the reduction in
exemplars (Martin, 1995). The Random Forests algorithm combines tree predictors
where values depend on values of a randomly sampled vector (Breiman, 2001). This
randomly sampled vector is part of a greater “forest” of trees and has the same
distribution of all the trees (Breiman, 2001). The trees then “vote” for the most popular
class, and the method has been shown to have lower generalization errors than other
classifiers (Breiman, 2001).
As demonstrated by the differing results in the two articles above, it is likely that
the specific ICS environment and type of attack highly influence the classification rates
and accuracy metrics of a given ML algorithm. This could indicate that an application of
differing ML approaches would yield different results based on the type of specific attack
being analyzed. Therefore, subsetting existing datasets could potentially provide
beneficial analysis for specific attacks that would be useful in early detection and
mitigation.

3.4 Data Cleaning and Initial Analysis

Due to the large number of variables (128) and samples (13,142) in the modified
dataset, the first step taken during analysis was an initial observation and subsequent
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cleaning of the data, in which data cleaning can be defined as the process of
transforming raw data to consistent data to facilitate analysis (De Jonge and Van Der
Loo, 2013). It should be noted, prior to this step, while R is capable of reading multiple
file formats including both ARFF and CSV, the author converted the original multiclass
ARFF files to CSV files to facilitate modification of the dataset, and also to convert the
file to a format that was easily readable for initial analysis in a program that the author
had experience with (Excel (Microsoft, 1987) (for R scripts detailing the conversion
process, see Appendix C). The dataset was modified to include only two scenarios
listed above in Section 2 of this work (scenario 41-normal operations, and scenarios 1520-remote tripping command injection attacks). This modification was executed to
simplify the dataset and facilitate remote tripping command injection attack analysis
regardless of exploitation of a single relay or multiple relays. The resulting modified
dataset utilized for further analysis of remote tripping command injection attacks was
comprised of 13,142 instances of which 8,737 instances were attacks, and 4,405
instances were normal operations.
After initial modification of the dataset, the next step in data cleaning was to
analyze the variables in the CSV file. This was executed through both manual analysis
utilizing filters in Excel, and from utilizing scripts in R. From this initial analysis, the
author determined that control panel logs from R1-R4 exhibited no presence of tripping
throughout the entire dataset. Additionally, the author identified that SNORT Logs for
Relays 1-4 had a sum total of 8 instances in which a packet was identified as sending a
trip command to a relay (twice for SNORT Log 1 identifying trip commands to R1 as
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indicated by Relay Log 1, once for SNORT Log 2 to identify trip commands to R2, three
times for SNORT Log 3 to identify trip commands to R3, and twice for SNORT Log 4 to
identify trip commands to R4). With only 8 instances of 8737 attacks (.091%),
representing 8 individual scenarios out of 105 total (7.61%), this likely indicates that
SNORT (and by extension other packet sniffing intrusion detection systems) is not an
integral component for identifying a remote tripping command injection attack for this
dataset and that synchrophasor measurements will largely be the basis for
detection/classification. SNORT and other log variables were not omitted from the
dataset however, as these variables are the only variables that represent IT
components, one of the unique characteristics that led to selection of this open source
dataset.
Also, during initial dataset analysis 1,379 instances of data were identified that
exhibited infinite values in the relay appearance impedance variables (R1.PA.Z – 399
values, R2.PA.Z – 377 values, R3.PA.Z – 315 values, and R4.PA.Z – 288 values).
Numerous errors occurred in processing the data in R due to these infinite values, but
due to the fact that all values corresponded to attacks (that in turn corresponded to
which relay was being attacked via remote tripping command injection (i.e., scenarios
15 and 19 for R1.PA.Z, scenarios 19 and 16 for R2.PA.Z, scenarios 17 and 20 for
R3.PA.Z, and scenarios 18 and 20 for R4.PA.Z), it was necessary to replace the infinite
values with a constant to facilitate further analysis in R.
As previous research has suggested that in both symmetric and asymmetric
distributions a linear interpolation for missing data values yields high degrees of
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accuracy in time series data with large sample sizes (where accuracy is measured in
mean absolute percentage error, mean absolute deviation, and mean squared
deviation), a modified method for imputation was utilized by taking the largest relay
appearance impedance values in each original scenario and applying a multiplier of 2 to
replace the infinite values in the dataset (Mahmoud, Date Unknown).1 By doubling the
largest values, a spike in the data relative to each specific scenario can be easily
observed. Analysis of all scenarios in the dataset which exhibited infinite values was
executed via Excel sorting filters to identify the largest values. This imputation
technique could be categorized as blending a single value approach as a constant was
used, and a local similarity approach as a series of values within each individual
scenario was utilized (Webb-Robertson, Wilberg, Matzke, Brown, Wang, McDermott,
Smith, Rodland, Metz, Pounds, and Waters, 2015). Imputation was necessary to avoid
eliminating over a thousand remote tripping command injection attack instances and to
retain as much data as possible in the dataset for analysis and model formation.
Upon completion of this data cleaning/transformation, the CSV file was read into
R for analysis of the variables (see Appendix B). Initial plots of all variables with respect
to the marker variable (whether the instance was an attack or not) were created after
the loading of the data (see Appendix D). While there were ranges of specific variables
that indicated an attack or normal operations, initial observation of these plots did not

1

Note, the first iteration of this data cleaning step utilized the arithmetic mean of the five greatest values
in a given scenario; this however yielded the majority of values being lower than the greatest value in a
cohort. Thus, to show the spike in activity, doubling the greatest value in a scenario (regardless if this
value was an outlier) was utilized
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yield significant results as the majority of the instances demonstrated a wide range of
values regardless if the instance was an attack or normal operations.

3.5 Statistical Methods Approach

A statistical methods approach was first employed to identify if simple and easily
employable methods could provide analysis and accurate classification of the dataset.
The overarching goal was to simplify and reduce the trivial elements of the dataset to
facilitate axiom development. The development of a small number of detection axioms
or rules was integral for implementation of a conceptual model in GINA, the original
direction of this work. To begin development of these rules and further analyze the
dataset given the initial observations from Section 3.4, two statistical methods were
utilized.
Logistic regression and by extension Stepwise Logistic Regression (SLR) was
the first statistical method employed. Logistic regression is considered a part of the
generalized linear model family, in which a response variable is discrete and errors do
not follow normal distributions (Lindquist, Date Unknown). This method is considered
appropriate in datasets such as the one used in this work where the data is binary and
categorical (Lindquist, Date Unknown). SLR refers to utilizing multiple logistic
regression equations to fit the data and remove variables, and RStudio incorporates
both forward and backward methods (i.e., starting the model with no variables and
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testing improvement in the model by adding explanatory variables, or starting with all
explanatory variables and removing them sequentially until no further improvement is
possible). Hybrid techniques integrating SLR have been utilized in the cybersecurity
domain to improve classification in large time series malware datasets (Huda, Bawajy,
Abdollahian, Islam, and Yearwood, 2016).
SLR was utilized in this work to remove variables in the dataset that had little
impact on instance classification. The ultimate goal was to reduce the complexity of the
dataset and thus facilitate the development of detection axioms. After fitting a logistic
model to the data (with the exception of SNORT, Relays, and Control Panel logs, as
SLR cannot be applied to the factor data type for explanatory variables), the stepwise
function was executed in R. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a widely utilized
model selection criterion based off likelihood and asymptotic properties of the maximum
likelihood estimator popularized by Hirotogu Akaike in his 1973 work, Information
Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle) and is used as the
primary component for goodness of fit in R during SLR (Pan, 2001). AIC is defined as
AIC = - 2logL(M) + 2*K, and the removal of explanatory variables that do not affect the
response variable will cause decreasing AIC values and thus indicate a model is
becoming more accurate. Once these variables are identified and removed, complexity
of the model is also decreased, which will help facilitate the construction of detection
axioms for remote tripping command injection attacks (Shtatland, Cain, and Barton,
2001; Akaike, 1973).
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After standardizing the data, logistic regression and SLR models were created in
RStudio, a data analysis software environment for the R programming language
(RStudio Inc., 2011) (see Appendix E for R Scripts). The AIC of the initial SLR model
based on the standardized dataset was 254,339.8.4 and was reduced to 151,248.9 by
the elimination of R4.PMI2.I (IED 4 Zero Current Phase Magnitude), R1. PM11.I (IED 1
Negative Current Phase Magnitude), and R3.PM7.V (IED 3 Positive Voltage Phase
Magnitude). This indicates that these variables should be removed from the model to
facilitate further analysis and axiom development, as they are not explanatory values
which affect the outcome as to whether an instance is an attack or normal operations.
By removing these variables bias and model inaccuracy will be decreased (Bozdogan,
1987).
However, utilizing the plot function in R to obtain the Residuals Scale-Location
indicated that there were 3,469 instances that did not conform to the initial logistic
regression model (see plot below; 9,673 instances did conform to the model as
indicated by the thick line running parallel to the X axis) (Wiegand, 2018). Residuals
can be thought of as False Negatives (FN), and that the models below would
misclassify these instances as normal operations (Wiegand, 2018). Due to the severity
of electrical outages and potential ramifications, it is necessary to catch all instances of
attacks with the lowest FN rate possible.
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Figure 3 - Residual Plot of Initial Logistic Regression Model

Through the use of filter commands in R the class of the high residuals were identified,
in which high residuals have over a value of 2.0 for the square root of the standard
deviance of residual value in the plot above. There were 3,469 high residuals identified,
and through the use of R Scripts all 3,469 instances were identified as of the attack
class (see Appendix E for R scripts/outputs) (Wiegand, 2018). After the removal of
R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V through utilization of the step function, the
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concentration of residuals remained in the same location, but the number decreased
(see figures below). Through a utilization of filter commands in R, there were 1,511
high residuals identified in the SLR model, and again all of these instances were of the
attack class (see second figure below and Appendix E for R scripts/outputs).

Figure 4 - Residual Plot of Stepwise Logistic Regression Model (vars R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V
removed)
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Table 6 – Initial Logistic and Stepwise Logistic Residual Comparison/AIC Values

These results indicate that while there is a subset of the dataset that can be
classified, that there is a significant portion which cannot. Unfortunately, this portion of
the dataset that cannot be classified easily is comprised of the attack data which this
work seeks to analyze. Because the residuals indicate a high number of FNs and
possible non-linearity, the dataset was split into two subsets for further examination.
These subsets were named “easy” and “hard”, in which the “easy” is termed as such as
the data initially seems to follow a linear pattern and is comprised of both attacks and
normal operations for the response variable. The “hard” subset is termed as such as
the attack data appears to not follow a linear trend as represented by the residual graph
above. Additional SLR models were fitted to each of these data subsets given the
residual data in an attempt to find if all variables were explanatory for these instances of
attacks. The focus for further analysis was the easy subset, as the hard subset was
comprised of all attacks and thus SLR would remove all variables from the initial model
and the AIC value would decrease to 0 (see image below for visual representation of
subsets) (Wiegand, 2018).

48

Figure 5 - Visual Representation of Data Subsets

Through plotting the residuals utilizing the same methods as the initial SLR
model, it was observed that while the residual position spatially is similar in the easy
data subset logistic regression model, the residual number are far less, but again
consisting of all attacks (see plot and table below) (for R scripts/output, see Appendix F
for R).
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Figure 6 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Initial Logistic Regression Model

After obtaining the initial easy logistic regression model from the easy data subset, the
step function was utilized to perform SLR. Far lower AIC values were observed initially
(5998.98), and significant AIC reduction was achieved through the removal of
R2.PA4.IH (AIC reduced to 4338.98). However, plotting the residuals of this
subsequent model and utilizing R Scripts to identify the numbers, it was observed that
while the AIC value decreased, the number of residuals increased. Due to the
implications of a FNs in the ICS context, despite lowering AIC values even one
additional instance should be grounds to nullify the removal of any variable (see figures
below).
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Figure 7 - Residual Plot of Easy Data Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model (R2.PA4.IH removed)

Table 7 - Easy Data Subset Residuals Comparison

Another iteration of stepwise logistic regression was executed given the easy
subset of data with the removal of suggested variables from the initial SLR model
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(R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V). As indicated by the tables and figures below,
there were 132 residuals present in the initial logistic regression model. After
application of the step function, the AIC decreased from 10462.4 to 4615.3, and the
residual number decreased through the removal of R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V,
R4.PA12.IH, an R3.PA9.VH (see figures/tables below).

Figure 8 - Easy Subset Logistic Regression Model 3 (with removal of R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V)
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Figure 9 - Easy Subset Stepwise Logistic Regression Model 4 (with removal of R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V,
R4.PA12.IH, and R3.PA9.VH)

Table 8 - Easy Subset Residuals Comparison (with omission of initial logistic regression variables)

In summary, SLR yielded minimal results due to complexity of the dataset and
large degrees of non-linearity indicated by residuals plots. More evidence of this lies in
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that of the three iterations of applying a step function to the logistic regression model,
while the AIC did decrease (at vastly different rates), the removal of variables was
inconsistent across all iterations. Through the utilization of SLR, eight unique variables
were identified to be omitted based on differing configurations of the initial logistic
regression models. Additionally, perhaps the most telling indicator of complexity and
non-linearity which creates difficulty in classification in the dataset is that all residuals
are attacks. The residual rate indicates thousands of misclassifications and less than a
90% accuracy classification, which is not an acceptable metric given the gravity and
implications of an attack on the grid. To further analyze the dataset, another statistical
method was employed.
The second statistical method utilized was Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
This method was formulated by Karl Pearson and is often regarded as forming the basis
for multivariate data analysis (Wold, Esbensen, Geladi, 1987). PCA is conducted
through the approximation of a larger matrix via the product of two smaller matrices
(Wold et al., 1987). This analysis was designed in Pearson’s words as trying to find
“lines and planes of closest fit to systems of points in space”, and the major goals of the
method include simplification of data, data reduction, general modeling, outlier
detection, variable selection, classification, prediction, and unmixing of data (Wold et al.,
1987). The majority of these goals are concerned with simplifying data for analysis,
which is aligned with the primary objective of this works initial statistical analysis (Wold
et al., 1987). The hope was that utilizing this method could simplify massive amounts of
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complex information into an understandable, palatable, and potentially actionable size
for axiom or rule development.
PCA was also primarily executed via formulation/execution of scripts in RStudio
(RStudio Inc., 2011). The dataset was first standardized and all non-factor variables
were removed and the prcomp function was utilized to create a model of the data
utilizing PCA (see Appendix A) (Wiegand, 2018; Coghlan, 2013). To visualize the data,
the screeplot function was used, and an analysis revealed that at approximately the 24th
to 25th transformation the slope starts to level off, which indicates a high degree of
variance in the data (see image below) (Wiegand, 2018).

Figure 10 - PCA Scree Plot
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This was further confirmed through the application of Kaiser’s Criterion which as applied
to the standardized data would include all translations where the variance was greater
than 1, which was through the 25th transformation (see figure below).

Figure 11 - PCA Standard Deviation and Proportion of Variance

Through an examination of the coefficients in the 25 rotations of the principal
components, in each of the 116 variables the absolute value of the coefficient was
greater than .15 in at least one of the principal components, meaning all the variables
were needed in at least one rotation, but many were needed in multiple rotations (see
truncated figure below, where x is a variable that represents the absolute value of a
principal component rotation given a variable).
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Figure 12 - PCA Coefficient Output

The results of PCA further suggest that the dataset is non-linear and will likely be
difficult to analyze via statistical methods. Also, the outputs suggest there is no simple
elimination of variables and thus no simplification of the dataset based on the variance
(Wiegand, 2018).
With the inability to simplify and reduce the dataset using the statistical methods
of PCA and SLR, axiom development through said methods is not feasible. The failure
of PCA and SLR indicates that the complexity of the dataset exceeds the capacity of
statistical methods to classify the data and that simple coding of rules/axioms to classify
an instance as an attack or normal operations is not possible based off this research
(and the given dataset).

Therefore, more sophisticated methods must be explored to
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both create detection axioms for remote tripping command injection attacks and classify
the dataset with a high degree of accuracy.

3.6 Machine Learning Algorithm Approach

As Section 3.3 provided compelling applications of ML algorithms in previous
research to classify scenarios in ICS, a similar ML methodology to the Borges-Hink et
al., 2014 article was utilized to determine if results could be replicated/exceeded given
remote tripping command injection attack and normal operational data. Aligned with
this previous related work, the author utilized 10-fold cross validation with a 90/10
train/test set to train the ML classifiers. Notable differences from the original research
include the utilization of only one dataset (binary) as opposed to the original experiment
which utilized three types of datasets (multiclass, three class, and binary). Additionally,
the original research conducted by Borges-Hink et al., 2014 applied the ML algorithms
to a 1% random sample of the original dataset, whereas this work considers the entire
modified dataset to increase data and thus analysis of remote tripping command
injection attacks.
The primary tool utilized in this research to employ ML and data mining
techniques was open source software called Waikato Environment for Knowledge
Analysis (WEKA) (University of Waikato, 1999). The WEKA project began at the
University of Waikato in 1992 with the goal of the creation of a unified workbench that
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would allow researchers access to a wide collection of ML techniques/methods in one
platform ((Hall, Frank, Holmes, Pfahringer, and Reutemann, 2009; Witten, Date
Unknown). While multiple ML algorithms and techniques were available at the time,
there was a wide array of languages/formats/platforms and no unifying application that
could be utilized to easily compare and contrast differing algorithms which is necessary
to determine applicability of a given method/technique (Hall et al., 2009; Witten, Date
Unknown). WEKA fixed this issue by allowing users to rapidly compare different ML
methods on datasets, and the software has been widely used in both academia and the
private sector since its initial software release (Hall et al., 2009).
The WEKA project was initially funded by the government of New Zealand and
was launched with an internal beta stage software release in 1994, and a release to the
public in 1996 (Hall et al., 2009). Due to increasing complications in the software such
as increasing changes to support libraries and complexity of configuration in the original
C coding, the system was rewritten in Java and rereleased in 1999 (Hall et al., 2009).
In addition to robust data visualization capabilities, WEKA Explorer (one off the four
WEKA interfaces) was primarily utilized in this work for data classification and
rule/model formulation. WEKA also includes interfaces for large scale performance
comparisons for differing ML methods on differing datasets (WEKA Experimenter), a
graphical interface (WEKA KnowledgeFlow), a unified interface (WEKA Workbench),
and a command line interface (WEKA Simple CU) (Whitten, Date Unknown). WEKA
does distinguish between data mining and ML, where data mining can be thought of as
the acquisition and transformation of raw data into information that can in turn be
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utilized to answer a given question or hypothesis (likely through the construction of a
predictive model), and ML can be thought of as the underlaying framework which solves
said question or hypothesis via the application of algorithms (Whitten, Date Unknown).
The diversity of academic disciplines that WEKA has been applied to are
numerous and wide spread, indicating an adaptable and applicable tool to apply ML
methods to a range of datasets and domains. In just the last year, WEKA has been
used as an integral component in research focused on maximizing the utility of
regression models in ML, online estimation of discrete/continuous/conditional densities,
ambient sensing of detection for relay attacks in near field communication devices
utilizing random forests, and even examining the intensity of emotion through the
analysis of tweets on the popular social media platform Twitter (Branco, Torgo, Ribeiro,
Frank, Pfahringer, and Rau, 2017; Geilke, Karwath, Frank, and Kramer, 2017; Gurulian,
Shepherd, Frank, Markantonakis, Akram, and Mayes, 2017; Mohammad and BravoMarquez, 2017; University of Waikato, Publications Page, 2018).
WEKA has also been utilized in research associated with cybersecurity and IDS.
Extensive WEKA classifier performance comparison has been applied in analysis of
attack signatures given the KDD99 dataset (Nguyan and Choi, 2008; Modi and Jain,
2015). Anomaly based network intrusion detection has also been explored via the use
of WEKA Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (J48) classifiers (Nevlud, Bures, Kapicak, and
Zdralek, 2013). Discrimination of malicious network communications and minimizing
reliance on a human operator to interpret an insurmountable amount of data has
propelled ML methods to prominence in cybersecurity, and there is utility in applying
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WEKA to research focused on ICS security (Borges-Hink, Beaver, Buckner, Morris,
Adhikari, and Pan, 2013). This open source software was utilized due to its noted
performance in multiple domains, it’s previously established related research, and also
due to its user friendly/intuitive nature and a manageable learning curve.
As mentioned above, for this research the WEKA Explorer interface was primarily
utilized (see figure below). After loading the dataset and applying preprocessing filters
to the data to ensure the software read in the proper datatypes (see Appendices H and I
for detailed steps in WEKA), all variables (which WEKA refers to as attributes) were
viewed to both confirm previous data analysis in R and further visualize the data given
WEKA’s capabilities (see figure below in which the red bars in the histogram represent
attacks and the blue represent normal operations) (Whitten, Date Unknown). Data
analysis was consistent with that already executed via R scripts (i.e., numbers of
attacks/normal operations). Mean, standard deviation, and the range of values differed
due to use of the original non-standardized dataset, which was aligned with previous
associated research. Classification utilizing ML algorithms was the next step executed
in WEKA.
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Figure 13 - WEKA Explorer Interface - Attribute Analysis

WEKA divides classification algorithms into seven distinct groups: Bayesian,
functions, lazy, meta, miscellaneous, rules, and decision trees (see table below for
descriptions of each). While research with the dataset in the past had tested a relatively
small number of ML algorithms using the default parameters, this work tested all
algorithms that could be applied to the dataset given classification specifications
regarding data types. The initial number of classifiers tested was 69, which decreased
to 15 based off the 95% accuracy metric established by Borges-Hink et al. and further
detailed in the testing methodology below.
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Table 9 - WEKA ML Classification Algorithm Groups (Brownlee, 2016; Tatsis, Tjortjis, and Tzirakis, 2013)

Classification Group

Description

Bayesian

Uses Bayes theorem in some
capacity which predict class values
by probabilities

Functions

Can be written as equation and
estimates a function

Lazy

Stores training instances and work
occurs during classification

Meta

Combine multiple algorithms and
convert them to more powerful
learners

Miscellaneous

Don’t fit easily into other groups

Rules

Generates rules to classify the data

Trees

Uses decision trees based off root
attributes and leaf nodes

A three-phase testing/training approach was utilized in which ML classification
algorithms were compared via extraction of key metrics from the WEKA Explorer
Classification panel (see figure below, as briefed to thesis advisory committee on
31MAY18).
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Figure 14 - ML Approach

After splitting the dataset to a 90% training set and a 10% test set using Ablebits
software for randomization in the dataset CSV file, the first phase utilized the full training
dataset to obtain baseline accuracy metrics and create classifier models (see figure
below) (Ablebits Software, 2015).
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Training Set - Baseline ML Algorithm Accuracy Rates
UserClassifier
RandomTree (Trees)
LMT
J48Consolidated (Trees)
HoeffdingTree (Trees)
ZeroR (Rules)
OneR (Rules)
Jrip (Rules)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - J48
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta)
Vote (Meta)
Stacking (Meta)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta)
MultiScheme (Meta) - +Jrip&J48ZeroR
MultiClassClassifierUpdateable
MultiClassClassifier (Meta) - JRIP
LogitBoost (Meta)
FilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - J48
CVParameterSelection (Meta)
Bagging (Meta) - J48
Bagging (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ LMT) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ NNGE) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)
LWL (Lazy)
IBK (Lazy)
SMO (RBF Kernel) -(Functions)
SimpleLogistic (Functions)
SGD (Functions)
Logistic (Functions)
NaiveBayesMultinomialText (Bayes)
BayesNet (Bayes)
0
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40

Figure 15 - Training Set - Baseline ML Algorithm Accuracy Rates
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Initial results indicated thirty-seven algorithms met the 95% baseline accuracy
established in previous research. The thirty-two classifiers that were omitted based on
having less than a 95% accuracy rate largely consisted of simplistic rule based learners,
Bayesian, and functions-based classifiers. The majority of classifiers that had 95%
classification accuracy or greater consisted of meta classifiers (see figure below).
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Training Set - Baseline ML Algorithm Accuracy Rates > 95%
RandomTree (Trees)
NNGe
RandomCommittee (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ PART) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ J48) (Meta)
KStar (Lazy)
LMT
Bagging (Meta) - J48
RandomSubspace (Meta)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - J48
MultiClassClassifier (Meta) - J48
J48graft (Trees)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
Bagging (Meta)
ClassificationViaRegression
REPTree (Trees)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - JRIP
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - JRIP
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48
0

20

40

Figure 16 - Baseline ML Algorithm - Accuracy > 95%

67

60

80

100

The second phase of the ML approach utilized 10-fold cross validation to
evaluate the classifier models based on the training dataset. Accuracy for all ML
algorithms decreased during the evaluation utilizing 10-fold cross validation, and of the
37 algorithms that were initially included in this stage, 22 had classification rates over
95% (see figures below). Of note, the majority were again meta classifiers (15),
followed by tree classifiers (5) and lazy classifiers (3).
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10x Cross Validation - ML Algorithm Accuracy
RandomTree (Trees)
NNGe (Rules)
RandomCommittee (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ PART) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ J48) (Meta)
KStar (Lazy)
LMT (Trees)
Bagging (Meta) - J48
RandomSubspace (Meta)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - J48
MultiClassClassifier (Meta) - J48
J48graft (Trees)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
Bagging (Meta)
ClassificationViaRegression (Meta)
REPTree (Trees)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - JRIP
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - JRIP
RanomizableFilteredClassifier (Meta) - J48
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Figure 17 - 10x Cross Validation

69

88

90

92

94

96

98

100

10x Cross Validation - > ML Algorithms > 95% Accuracy
RandomCommittee (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - J48
IBK (Lazy)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
Bagging (Meta) - JRIP

RandomTree (Trees)
J48graft (Trees)
J48 (Trees)
MultiScheme (Meta) - +Jrip&J48ZeroR
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - J48
93

94
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Figure 18 - 10x Cross Validation - >95% Accuracy
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After identification of the algorithms that were evaluated at greater than 95%,
accuracy, the models were applied to an independent dataset. To better evaluate the
ML algorithms and identify the most ideal classification scheme, additional metrics
captured during this final iteration included Root Mean Squared Error, FN rates for the
attack class, Recall, Precision, F-Measure, and the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) Curve (see table below for brief descriptions).
Table 10 - Additional ML Metrics (Holmes, 2000, Borges-Hink et al., 2014; Whitten, Date Unknown)

Metric

Description

Root Mean Squared Error

A standard metric for measuring the
spread of y values about the predicted
y value; found by squaring the
residuals, averaging the squares, and
taking the square root

Recall

Measures the true positive rate

Precision

Measures the positive predictive value

F-Measure

Harmonic mean of Recall and
Precisions

ROC Curve

A plot that measures classification
accuracy of the first class against the
classification accuracy of the second
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Metric

Description
class; maximization of area under the
curve indicates highest measure of
classification accuracy

Time Taken

The time taken to apply the model to
the test set; only utilized for
comparison of top 3 models (no
graphs)

The initial test set comprised of 22 ML algorithms was decreased to a final 16 algorithms,
which was further decreased to 15 algorithms based off redundant results from the
RandomSubspace with the default REPTree base classifier and RandomSubspace with
J48 as the base classifier. Since the outputs were the same, only the RandomSubspace
with the default base classifier was retained (see tables below). Of the final 15 ML
algorithms with accuracy over 95% as evaluated on the test set, 10 were meta classifiers,
3 were tree classifiers, and 2 were lazy classifiers.
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Test Set - ML Algorithm Accuracy
RandomForest (Trees)
RandomCommittee (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ J48) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)
AdaboostM1 (w/ LMT) (Meta)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - J48
AdaboostM1 (w/ PART) (Meta)
IBK (Lazy)
KStar (Lazy)
RandomSubspace (Meta) - JRIP
Bagging (Meta) - J48
Bagging (Meta) - JRIP
Bagging (Meta)
RandomTree (Trees)
LMT (Trees)
J48graft (Trees)
RandomSubspace (Meta)
J48 (Trees)
WeightedInstancesHandlerWrapper (Meta) - J48
MultiScheme (Meta) - +Jrip&J48ZeroR
MultiClassClassifier (Meta) - J48
CVParameterSelection (Meta) - J48

98.63
98.7
98.63
97.86
98.17
98.17
97.94
98.55
98.01
97.4
96.42
96.26
95.58
96.03
95.42

94.43
97.4
94.05
94.05
94.05
94.05
94.05
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Figure 19 - Test Set - ML Algorithm Accuracy
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Test Set - ML Algorithms > 95% Accuracy
RandomCommittee (Meta)

98.703

RandomForest (Trees)

98.627

AdaboostM1 (w/ J48) (Meta)

98.627

IBK (Lazy)

98.55

AdaboostM1 (w/ LMT) (Meta)

98.169

RandomSubspace (Meta) - J48

98.169

KStar (Lazy)

98.016

AdaboostM1 (w/ PART) (Meta)

97.94

AdaboostM1 (w/ JRIP) (Meta)

97.864

RandomSubspace (Meta)

97.406

Bagging (Meta) - J48

96.415

Bagging (Meta) - JRIP

96.262

RandomTree (Trees)

96.033

Bagging (Meta)

95.575

LMT (Trees)

95.423
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Figure 20 - Test Set - >95% Accuracy

74

96

97

98

99

>95% ML Algorithm Root Mean Squared Error - Test Set
RandomCommittee (Meta)

0.116

RandomForest (Trees)

0.122

AdaboostM1 (w/ J48) (Meta)

0.117

IBK (Lazy)

0.12

AdaboostM1 (w/ LMT) (Meta)

0.124

RandomSubspace (Meta) - J48

0.137
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Figure 21 - Test Set - Root Mean Squared Error
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Figure 22 - Test Set - Precision Rates
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>95% ML Algorithm Recall Rates - Test Set
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Figure 23 - Test Set - Recall Rates
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>95% ML Algorithm F-Measure Rates - Test Set
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Figure 24 - Test Set - F-Measure Rates
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>95% ML Algorithm False Negative Rates - Test Set
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Figure 25 - Test Set - False Negative Rates
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Figure 26 - ROC Curve
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Given these metrics, the top three classifiers based purely on accuracy
rates consisted of 2 meta classifiers and one tree classifier and had the following
accuracy rates: RandomCommittee (98.703%), RandomForest (98.627%), and
AdaboostM1+J48

(98.627%).

The

RandomCommittee

classifier

also

outperformed RandomForest and AdaboostM1+J48 in regards to the highest
Recall, Precision, and F-Measure, and the lowest Root Mean Squared Error. The
RandomForest classifier outperformed RandomCommittee and AdaboosttM1+J48
in terms of the ROC Curve (.998 compared to .997 and .996 respectively) and also
most importantly the FN rate (.005 compared to .007 and .006 respectively).
Based on the catastrophic consequences of not identifying an attack quickly in an
ICS environment, the FN rate should be given a great degree of weight when
identifying the highest performing classifier. While the Time Taken (TT) rate is
slightly higher for the RandomForest classifier compared to RandomCommittee
and AdaboostM1+J48 (.08 seconds compared to .04 seconds and .07 seconds
respectively), at least given the size of this dataset the increase in classification of
attacks and minimization of FNs is worth the increase in computational time.
However, with larger datasets or implementation in an IDS (and much larger
volumes of data), this TT metric should be considered to a larger extent. Despite
the relatively longer TT rate to evaluate the test data, the extremely high accuracy
and the highest FN rate of the RandomForest algorithm suggests it is the highest
performer. Also of note, of the 100 Random Trees generated in the RandomForest
algorithm, the average size of the tree was 900.3 nodes (see Appendix J for model
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output from the first Random Tree). Finally, conducting analysis through the
attribute importance function within the RandomForest algorithm, it appears that
109 of the 128 attributes were used to classify an instance in at least one node of
a Random Tree in the model (see Appendix J). This further confirms the results
of the statistical methods, as classification is highly dependent on the utilization of
a large number of variables.
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section presents a summary of the results and contributions of the research,
issues and limitations experienced during the course of the research, and the potential
for future work.

4.1 Results/Contributions

Given the current state of cybersecurity and its role in information operations and
geopolitics, the research of exploitations of the electrical grid are extremely important
and have the potential to directly affect national security. This work was focused on one
possible exploitation that has been documented, but there are likely a myriad of other
attack vectors as the attack surface is vast. Still, common TTPs such as spear phishing
and an escalation of privileges through credential theft are being utilized to gain access
to these networks, and training/education in proper cybersecurity practices within the
ICS environment should be at the forefront of organizations in the energy sector.
However, given that these TTPs are still effective and will likely remain effective, a
hybrid IDS based off of synchrophasor data attack signatures is a necessity to quickly
identify malicious activity and mitigate damaging effects. This research increased the
knowledge base of remote tripping command injection attacks by demonstrating that
multiple ML algorithms have a high degree of accuracy and are potentially good
candidates to form the basis of a detection platform while statistical methods are
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insufficient. The contribution to this specific area of cybersecurity/ICS is that this
research suggests that detection axioms or rules cannot be formulated for remote
tripping command injection attacks using the statistical methods of SLR and PCA, and
thus should not be attempted when building signature based models of these attacks.
Also, given that different attacks could be characterized with optimal performance
based on differing ML algorithms, this is a contribution to the body of knowledge
regarding remote tripping command injection attacks. While the sheer volume of data
from these measurement units is vast and likely unfathomable to a human operator, the
application of ML methods can make sense of the data with a high degree of accuracy.
This research broadened the scope of analysis by the application of numerous ML
algorithms that had not been applied to analysis of remote tripping command injection
attacks in previous work to the best knowledge of the author. Based on the
preponderance of meta classifiers achieving 95% or greater accuracy on the test set,
this research also suggests that more sophisticated ML algorithms have greater
performance classification of remote tripping command injection attacks than simpler
ML algorithms. This is related to the finding that the vast majority of variables were
needed to formulate the RandomForest model which achieved the highest performance.
Additionally, this research suggests different findings from Borges-Hink et al in which
JRip+Adaboost was identified as the highest performing classifier for the entire dataset
and the only classifier of seven that could classify at 95% or greater accuracy. For the
subset explored in this work including only remote tripping command injection attacks
and normal operational data, there are 15 algorithms that can accurately classify over a
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95% rate. The work conducted by Borge-Hink et al had classification rates of
approximately 95% and 79% over the entire binary dataset for JRipper+Adaboost and
RandomForest respectively, while classification rates for remote tripping command
injection attacks were 97.864% and 98.627% respectively. This suggests that specific
attacks are classified with higher accuracy through an application of differing ML
algorithms, and that in this case RandomForest is a better classifier for remote tripping
command injection attacks than JRipper+Adaboost. To provide a synopsis of the
results related to the Research Questions introduced in Section 1, each Research
Question is addressed below.

4.1.1 Research Question 1 (RQ1) Results

The answer to RQ1 is that the statistical methods used in this research could not
accurately model features of remote tripping command injection attacks on electrical
grids due to a high degree of non-linearity and complexity in the dataset. It should be
noted, that the original intent of this project was to determine simplistic detection axioms
for remote tripping command injection attacks utilizing statistical methods. As described
above, due to the composition of the dataset, these axioms were not possible to create
given the statistical methods utilized. This is not to say that all statistical methods are
incapable of producing axioms or rules that properly characterize data and thus provide
an output as to whether at attack is occurring or not, but that the application of the
methods SLR and PCA were unfruitful given the execution of scripts in R.
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4.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) Results

Through an execution of numerous ML algorithms in WEKA, it is clear that given
the modified dataset that classification over 95% is possible for many algorithms (refer
to Section 3.5). After splitting the dataset into training and test sets, accuracy metrics
were determined via the use of the entire training set to build classifier models and
evaluation through 10-fold Cross Validation. After execution of 10-fold Cross Validation
was conducted an additional iteration of testing was conducted on an independent test
set, it was determined that 15 algorithms achieved over 95% classification rates.
Additionally, other metrics such as the FN rate suggest that the RandomForest
model/detection axioms could be potentially be utilized in future work due to its high
performance.

4.1.3 Research Question 3 (RQ3) Results

This is dependent on the individual IDS of an ICS environment, but this work has
laid the groundwork for developing a signature based model for remote tripping
command injection attacks based on detection axioms. Signature based models of
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attacks have been utilized with high degrees of success and synchrophasor
measurements based IDS have demonstrated a capacity to detect attacks that
traditional IDS in ICS have not. The ML models formulated in this work are detection
axioms or rules that characterize or describe remote tripping command injection attacks
to a great degree of accuracy and could be utilized in future work with further validation.

4.1.4 Research Question 4 (RQ4) Results

GINA takes information from disparate domains (i.e., IT logs and OT sensor
data), collates the data, and utilizes a unique form of modeling that has the ability to
classify the data. While it is first necessary to construct a conceptual model based on
detection axioms for implementation into GINA, there is a possibility given accuracy
levels of the highest performing ML algorithms that the models/detection axioms
established in this work could be incorporated in future work (see Section 4.3 for
additional information about GINA) (Anderson, 2018).

4.2 Issues/Limitations

Given the omission of natural events and other attacks in the modified dataset
used in this work, it is possible that the simplification of the dataset led to an increase in
classification rates via the reduction in noise created by additional scenarios. The
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modifications to the original dataset while extensive are still essentially subsetting the
data into a more manageable and simpler dataset. While this was intentional to analyze
only remote tripping command injection attacks in comparison to normal operations, the
conditions are not representative of all activity/scenarios that could be experienced in an
ICS environment. Also, in Borges-Hink et al. the datasets were randomly sampled at
1% of the original dataset to reduce the size and evaluate the effectiveness of small
sample sizes. This must be noted in the final results, as the dataset used in this work
was approximately 3x greater than this dataset. Additionally, infinite values were
modified in the dataset to facilitate analysis in R as detailed in Section 3.4 and were
kept for the purpose of analysis comparison and consistency across ML and statistical
methods.
Another associated issue in both the original dataset and the modified dataset
used in this research is class imbalance. As previously mentioned in Section 3.4, there
were 8,737 attacks and 4,405 normal operational instances. This does not likely mirror
the daily operational data distribution observed in an ICS environment due to the large
proportion of attacks compared to normal operations. Therefore, if a more realistic
dataset was evaluated with the top performing ML algorithms identified in this work, the
results could differ significantly. In future work, methods of reducing class imbalance
could be employed on this dataset and the resulting ML algorithm accuracy metrics
could be comparatively evaluated (Caulkins, 2018; Lathrop, 2018; Wiegand, 2018).
A peripheral technical issue associated with this work is that synchrophasor units
can be targeted by attackers, as IECC C37.1118 (the protocol for synchrophasor data
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communication) does not support any authentication and thus readings of sensors could
be manipulated and render a system obsolete through exploitation of Man-in-the-Middle
types of attacks (Borges-Hink et al., 2014; Yang, McLaughlin, Sezer, Littler, Pranggono,
Brogan, and Wong, 2013). This was outside the scope of this research, which sought to
utilize synchrophasor data to detect remote tripping command injection attacks but did
not address exploitation of the PMUs themselves. Another technical issue is that this
dataset reflects a non-pilot directional over current relay protection scheme in multiple
source circuits (Pan et al., March 2015). While this type of protection was utilized in the
original study due that makes up the majority of the electric transmission system, other
circuits exist such as loop and radial circuits are also present in the electrical grid and
the results/models obtained in this work could be nonapplicable to systems with these
components (Pan et al., March 2015).
There are also potential WEKA comparison issues with the previous work
conducted by Borges-Hink et al. After consulting with the lead author about parameters
and reading datatypes in to WEKA, due to a loss of the original results an approximation
of accuracy, precision, recall, and F-Measure was used based off interpretation of
graphs in the article. Additionally, the author stated that he did not believe he used IT
component logs for his paper, which would indicate IT variables have little to no effect
on classification accuracy in the original work. While this would be a unique contribution
to the body of research for this work, the original work does directly refute this by
including the IT logs as part of Results Section C (Borges-Hink et al., 2014). Finally, to
compare training to test sets an InputMappedClassifier application was used in WEKA
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so that differing value ranges for R1-R4.PA.Z could be utilized during the final phase of
testing. The original author stated that he could not recall how he had compared
training to test sets in WEKA and could not confirm or deny he used the
InputMappedClassifier (Borges-Hink, 2018). Also, regarding the WEKA evaluation
methodology, the ML algorithms are stochastic methods that were only run once during
analysis in this work (Wiegand, 2018). It is likely that reevaluating the ML algorithms
with differing Random Seed values would result in differing metrics and could potentially
give a more complete picture of a model’s ability to classify remote tripping command
injection attacks (Wiegand, 2018).
Another associated issues about the PMU data in IDS is consternation regarding
data storage. If this small testbed architecture is generating over 13,000 datapoints in a
short amount of time, there are undoubtedly related issues regarding storage of the
data, policies related as to how long to keep the data, and what criteria would need to
be met to keep data long term at the present time (Redwood, 2018). This is likely a
reason for energy companies to rely on more traditional IDS without synchrophasor
measurements incorporated, but with the increase in computational power and storage
capacity there is a possibility that IDS incorporating synchrophasor data will become
more widespread (Redwood, 2018).

4.3 Future Work
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While this research suggests that ML models/axioms were successful in
identifying remote tripping command injection attacks, further research and additional
testing should be done to confirm these results. Testing actual remote tripping
command injections outside of a laboratory or testbed environment is likely not possible
due to the ramifications of the attack, but the ML algorithms/detection axioms could be
validated on multiple independent datasets. A future expansion of this work could be to
incorporate the other attack and natural scenarios in a binary dataset and observe if the
accuracy metrics were replicated. Further parameter calibration of the highest
performing ML algorithms identified could be another potential direction for expanding
this work. An analysis given these axioms/ML models and a different testbed
architecture could be utilized to find if accuracy metrics are confirmed in a completely
independent dataset (i.e., one that is not a subset of existing data). If the detection
axioms/attack models are confirmed in separate independent testing, this increases the
viability of integrating this research into a hybrid IDS that incorporates synchrophasor
data.
There is also a potential for Vector Relational Data Modeling (VRDM) to be
utilized in future work as it has been shown to be effective in real time multivariate
analysis (Dougherty, 2017). VRDM is the underlying framework or the programming
language engine powering a software solution called the Global Information Network
Architecture (GINA), which has been utilized for such applications as identifying and
comparing Naval Energy Weapons systems, enabling system interoperability in smart
mobile system services of network decision support systems, geospatial mapping of IP
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addresses, and automated threat analysis via IDS (Dougherty, 2017; Dolk, Busalacchi,
Anderson and Tinsley, 2012, ,and Cohort 19, Team Bravo, 2013). GINA recognizes
relationships between data objects specified by the user and does not require coding,
which offers benefits in time conservation and also decreases errors associated with
physically coding the model and encourages a focus on the design of overarching
attributes and functionality of the model, as opposed to hard coded mechanics (Cohort
19, Team Bravo, 2013; Dolk et al., 2012). Additionally, a model can be easily
recalibrated or modified and does not force a complete recoding effort (Cohort 19, Team
Bravo, 2013; Dolk et al., 2012).
As demonstrated in the previous sections, ICS environments have many complex
relationships that increases the difficulty of constructing an accurate model. GINA
provides the user with an interface to model these complex interactions across domains
that is both intuitive and not resource intensive, which is especially appropriate given
the nature and interconnected relationships of vast amounts of IT and OT components
in ICS. Conceptual relationship models can be easily implemented given a user’s
knowledge of a domain and ability to discern interactions between components. While it
was not possible to integrate the ML models/detection axioms established in this
research due to time constraints stemming from complications during dataset analysis,
the ML models/detection axioms established in this work could potentially be
implemented in GINA in the future for further analysis of remote tripping command
injection attacks (Anderson, 2018).
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APPENDIX A. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS R SCRIPTS
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The scripts below in R detail the process of executing Principal Component
Analysis given the standardized dataset (Coghlan, 2013 and Wiegand, 2018). Outputs
include the screeplot, standard deviation/proportion of variance, and coefficient analysis
of the 25 rotations.
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APPENDIX B. INITIAL LOADING AND DATASET ANALYSIS
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The loading, initial summary, and structure of the data was found through the
execution of the R Scripts below (Boone, 2010, Stack Overflow Thread, 2014, Stack
Overflow Thread, 2015, Mollie, 2013, and Wiegand, 2018). Outputs for the data
summary and structure are shown below the R scripts.
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APPENDIX C. EXPORT OF MULTICLASS DATASET
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To both modify the original dataset with only applicable data and facilitate initial
data analysis in an easily readable format, the following data conversion was conducted
via R. This process was iterative, in that each of the fifteen datasets in ARFF format
was read in via the file choose function, and then exported to a CSV file and named
sequentially (i.e., test1, test2…test15). Upon completion each iteration, the author
utilized the summary function to ensure that the data in the newly exported files
matched the original datasets, and also checked the CSVs manually via opening the
files and observing/comparing the data. A screenshot of the R script is displayed below
(Comprehensive R Archive Network, Date Unknown).
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APPENDIX D. INITIAL PLOTS OF AURORA DATASET
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The first R script below was utilized to produce the plots for R1 given the nonstandardized dataset. R2, R3, R4 were produced using the same commands (given the
different variables with respect to marker). The second R script below was utilized to
produce bar charts for R1. Bar charts were selected due to both the marker and
relay/SNORT logs were binary data. Relay and snort logs 2-4 were produced utilizing
the same commands (control panel graphs omitted due to all data being a 0 indicating
normal operations) (Kabacoff, 2017). The plots of each of the 129 variables are listed
below the R Script.
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APPENDIX E. INITIAL STANDARDIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND STEPWISE
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS

114

The R scripts and subsequent outputs below are of the initial logistic regression
model and subsequent stepwise logistic regression model given the standardized
dataset (Wiegand, 2018). All logs were removed due to constraints of R to create
generalized linear models with numeric data types. The initial output from logistic
regression also displays that R4.S should likely be removed due to its importance (all
values were 0 for this variable in the non-standardized dataset, and -.04 in the
standardized dataset). After the application of the step function, the AIC value was
reduced from 254339.8 to 151248.9 with the removal of R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and
R3.PM7.V. For brevity, only the output showing the beginning AIC value and the final
results are included below. Residual plots and scripts to identify
numbers/characteristics of residuals of both the initial data and subsequent stepwise
models are displayed after the R outputs.
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APPENDIX F. EASY SUBSET STANDADIZED LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND
STEPWISE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS
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The R scripts/outputs below show the subsetting of the standardized dataset and
logistic regression and SLR models given the easy subset (indicated by over a value of
2.0 of the square root of the standard deviance) (Wiegand, 2018). As the results from
summary of the easy logistic regression model were replicated from the initial logistic
regression in that all variables are significant, it is not included below. After the
application of the step function, the AIC value was reduced from 5999.98 to 4333.98
with the removal of R2.PA4.IH.

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

APPENDIX G. EASY STANDARDIZED STEPWISE MODEL 3 AND 4 LOGISTIC
REGRESSION

137

The same process was utilized for these logistic and stepwise logistic regression
models given the easy subset, but with the omission of variables from the initial
stepwise logistic regression model (R4.PM12.I, R1.PM11.I, and R3.PM7.V). After the
application of the step function, the AIC value was reduced from 10462.4 to 4615.3 with
the removal of R2.PA2.VH, R1.PM8.V, R4.PA12.IH, and R3.PA9.VH.
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APPENDIX H. LOADING AND PREPROCESSING DATA IN WEKA
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After opening WEKA software, the Explorer option was chosen (see first image
below). Utilizing the “Open file” button in the upper right hand corner in the Preprocess
tab in the GUI, the training dataset was selected and opened (TRAINING SPLIT –
FINAL – NO INFS – BINARY (UPDATED AS OF 18MAY18).csv,arff; see second image
below). After loading the dataset, variables (referred to as attributes in WEKA) are
displayed with the minimum values, maximum values, mean, and standard deviation in
the GUI (see third image below; the first variable R1-PA1-VH is displayed). Upon
observing the data, it was noticed that multiple variables were incorrectly classified by
data type. Specifically, that nominal/binary values were being read in to WEKA as
numeric values (variables 117-129, all log files and the marker). To address this, the
variables whose data types were incorrect were selected and the filter
NumerictoNominal was applied (see fourth image below). The attributes/indices were
then modified to incorporate the applicable variables by right clicking in the space and
selecting “show properties” and then “OK” (see fifth image below). After closing the
properties box, the “Apply” button was selected in order to change the data types of the
selected variables from numeric to nominal. The output of a selected variable was
automatically colored after this step (blue for normal operations, red for an attack) and
the data type in the selected attribute panel reflects a nominal data type (see sixth
image below). This concludes the steps taken to preprocess the data in WEKA prior to
classification of the dataset.
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APPENDIX I. DATASET CLASSIFICATION IN WEKA
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After preprocessing the dataset in WEKA, the “Classify” tab was selected, and
under the “Classifier” panel various classifier were selected to compare performance
(the image below only shows AdaboostM1+JRipper). AdaboostM1+JRipper was first
selected using the “Choose” button under the “meta” classifiers folder, and the
properties were modified to utilize this classifier in conjunction with JRipper. This was
done via right clicking in the space next to AdaboostM1 next to the “Choose” button and
selecting “Show Properties” (see second image below). The classifier JRipper was then
selected by clicking the “Choose” button next to the classifier field, and then selecting
JRipper from the “rules” classifier folder and then clicking “OK” (see third image below).
The classification was then initiated via clicking the “Start” button in the “Test options”
panel.
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APPENDIX J. RANDOMFOREST ML ALGORITHM OUTPUTS
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The WEKA output below includes the first Random Tree from the RandomForest
algorithm, attribute importance, and summary statistics. Due to the large size of the
output consisting of 100 Random Trees, only the first will be displayed for brevity.
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